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FOURTH AMENDMENT-EXCLUSIONARY RULE-IMPEACHMENT USE
OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE WHEN DEFENDANT TESTIFIES-
People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350
(1972).
A sharply divided California Supreme Court recently resurrected
a limitation on the impeachment use exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule thought laid to rest by the United States Supreme
Court early in 1971. In People v. Taylor1 a four justice majority of the
California court, led by Justice Mosk,2 held that evidence obtained by
a search conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be
used to impeach the testimony of a defendant who on direct examination
merely denied the charges against him. The dissenting justices' felt
the decision should have been controlled by Harris v. New York,4
wherein a similarly divided United States Supreme Court allowed
statements obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to be used for impeachment purposes.
Earl Taylor and a female companion were arrested on a charge of
grand theft of an automobile. Searches of the vehicle turned up various
narcotics and related paraphernalia.5 During trial on charges arising
from discovery of this contraband, Taylor denied ownership of the articles
and denied having ever seen certain of the evidence except at the pre-
liminary hearing and a prior trial." On cross-examination, the prosecutor
launched into a broad line of questioning, despite repeated objections
by Taylor's counsel.7  After eliciting Taylor's admission that he had
1. 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972).
2. Justices Peters, Tobriner and Sullivan concurred in Justice Mosk's opinion.
3. Justice Burke wrote the dissenting opinion. He was joined by Chief Justice
Wright and Justice McComb.
4. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). An analysis of the Harris case and a review of the im-
peachment exception to the exclusionary rules is contained in Note, The Reconstitution
of Self-Incrimination: Harris v. New York, 5 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 193 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Reconstitution].
5. 8 Cal. 3d at 176, 501 P.2d at 919, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 351. The legality of these
searches was not at issue in Taylor. Id.
6. id. at 177, 501 P.2d at 920, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 352. The prior trial resulted in a
mistrial. Id.
7. Id. at 177-78, 501 P.2d at 920, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 352. Among the questions
asked on cross-examination was whether Taylor had ever seen narcotics before,
whether he had ever seen heroin before, whether he had ever seen balloons before,
and whether he had ever had a balloon in his possession containing heroin. Id. at
178, 501 P.2d at 920, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
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some familiarity with various narcotics, 8 the prosecuting attorney asked
him if he had ever been arrested with a balloon of heroin in his pos-
session. After lengthy in-chamber hearings on a defense objection
to this question, the trial judge ordered Taylor to answer. Taylor
admitted he had once been stopped on a street comer and searched
and that the searching officer had removed a "little piece of balloon"
from his (Taylor's) pocket, but claimed that he had not put the balloon
in the pocket, thus permitting the inference that the searching officer
had done so. 9
To rebut this inference, the prosecutor called police sergeant Luther
McCormick, a witness to the street search. McCormick narrated a
scene wherein he and another officer had seen Taylor, who was ap-
parently "'under the influence of something,'" crossing a street early
in the morning.10 The other officer stopped Taylor, subjected him to
a "pat-down" search, and reached into his pocket, removing a balloon of
heroin. Although the defense objected that the search was illegal and
that evidence concerning it should therefore be excluded," the trial
court held the evidence to be admissible for the limited purpose of
impeachment. Sergeant McCormick then testified that "he had seen
nothing in the officer's hand as it was thrust into defendant's pocket"
and that the balloon removed from Taylor's pocket contained heroin. 2
The jury, which had been instructed that the only purpose for which
the sergeant's testimony might be used was to impeach the credibility
of Taylor, thereafter found Taylor guilty as charged.'
Taylor appealed the judgment of conviction, claiming, as he had at
the time of trial, that the impeachment allowed was precluded by the
8. Taylor explained "that he had been raised 'in the lower-class section of the
town,'" and had seen marijuana cigarettes and "red devils." Id.
9. This search was conceded to have been conducted in violation of both United
States and California constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Taylor court pointed out that merely appearing to be "'under the in-
fluence of something' while lawfully crossing a street at an early hour did not give
the police reasonable grounds to believe he was 'armed and dangerous"' as required
for a pat-frisk without a warrant under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 8 Cal. 3d at 178-79, 501 P.2d at 921, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 353. Additionally, California authorities do not allow the feeling of a soft
object in a pocket during a search for weapons to justify going into the pocket for
purposes of self-protection. Id. at 179, 501 P.2d at 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
10. 8 Cal. 3d at 178, 501 P.2d at 920-21, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53.
11. Id., 501 P.2d at 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
12. Id. at 178-79, 501 P.2d at 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
13. The ability of a jury to distinguish between use of evidence to prove the truth
of the matter stated or merely to impeach a witness, and to rely only on the former
in reaching a verdict has often been questioned. Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 211.
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Agnello v. United
States14 and Walder v. United States.15 In Agnello the defendant, on
direct examination, denied involvement in an alleged conspiracy to sell
cocaine. 16 During cross-examination, despite objection, the prosecutor
was allowed to ask Agnello whether he had ever seen narcotics before.
Agnello denied any knowledge of or involvement with narcotics. He
was then questioned concerning a can of cocaine which had been ob-
tained through an illegal search during the investigation of the alleged
conspiracy. When Agnello denied having previously seen the cocaine,
the prosecution rebutted with evidence concerning the search and seizure
of the cocaine from Agnello's home.17 Relying on the reasoning in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,'5 the Agnello Court held
that where the defendant did not testify on direct examination concerning
the illegal evidence, and where in response to the cross-examination
allowed he had merely denied ever seeing the contraband, he "did
nothing to waive his constitutional protection or to justify cross-exam-
ination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by
the search."'19
It was the Taylor majority's view that the later case of Walder
v. United States,20 although allowing impeachment use of illegally
seized evidence, reaffirmed by distinction the Agnello doctrine. In
Walder, during a trial for selling narcotics, the defendant testified
of his own accord during direct questioning (and again during cross-
examination) that he had never sold or possessed narcotics. In the
light of this "sweeping claim," the Court ratified the use for impeach-
ment purposes of testimony concerning heroin unlawfully obtained
from Walder two years earlier in an unrelated transaction. Although
it was conceded that such illegally obtained evidence could not be used
14. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
15. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
16. Agnello and others were charged with conspiracy to sell cocaine without having
registered with the Collector of Internal Revenue and having payed the prescribed tax.
269 U.S. at 28. During direct examination, Agnello testified that he had received
packages from a co-defendant, but did not know their contents and would not have
carried them had he known they contained narcotics. Id. at 29.
17. Id. at 30. Evidence concerning the finding of the can of cocaine had previously
been offered and excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id.
18. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Silverthorne Court declared:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all. Id. at 392, quoted in Agnello, 269 U.S. at
35, and Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d at 181, 501 P.2d at 922, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
19. 269 U.S. at 35.
20. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
1973]
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against the defendant in the case in chief, the Court refused to allow
the defendant to "turn the illegal method by which evidence . . .was
obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against
contradiction of his untruths."'" Such a perversion of the Fourth
Amendment was decried by the Court.
Based on its analysis of Agnello and Walder, the majority in Taylor
concluded "that a defendant 'must be free to deny all the elements of the
case against him,' "22 and noted that Taylor had done nothing more
in his direct testimony than deny ownership of the specific contraband
taken from the automobile at the time of his arrest. Even if he had made
a general denial of the crime of pessession of narcotics, the court
reasoned, "there is a world of difference between a technically inferable
negation of one element of the crime charged, and the explicit and
'sweeping' claim of ignorance of all narcotics made by the defendant
in Walder."23
The Taylor majority also felt that the instant case was distinguishable
from the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris v. New York.24
In Harris the defendant denied making one of two charged sales of
heroin and gave a detailed account of larcenous intent to sell baking
powder represented as heroin in the second instance. To impeach
Harris' credibility, contradictory excerpts from transcribed statements
made by Harris during earlier interrogation by the police were read
into evidence, although the custodial questioning had concededly been
conducted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.25 Over a scathing dissent,
the majority in Harris, assuming the prior statements to be true and
those at trial false, concluded that:
"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license
to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's
credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting
statements."'2 6
The California court pointed out that Taylor, unlike Harris, "offered
no elaborate justification for his conduct, and the prior illegally obtained
21. Id. at 65. The Walder Court distinguished Agnello as a case in which the
defendant did not of his own accord go beyond a denial of the elements of the crime
with which he was charged. Id. at 65-66.
22. 8 Cal. 3d at 184, 501 P.2d at 924, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 356, quoting Walder, 347
U.S. at 65.
23. 8 Cal. 3d at 183, 501 P.2d at 924, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
24. 401 U.S. at 222 (1971).
25. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. 8 Cal. 3d at 184, 501 P.2d at 925, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 357, quoting Harris, 401
U.S. at 226 (emphasis by the California Supreme Court).
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evidence was therefore not 'inconsistent' or 'conflicting' with that testi-
mony. [Taylor] did not rely on the illegality of the impeaching evidence
as a sword to commit perjury, but simply as a shield against the con-
sequences of concededly improper police practices."27
The majority then determined that the constitutional error committed
at trial was not harmless and reversed Taylor's conviction."8 In the
majority's view, the evidence against Taylor was circumstantial and
"ambiguous at best."29  Aside from testimony by the police as to the
evidence obtained from the automobile, the primary evidence against
Taylor was testimony by the woman arrested with him. She was an
admitted heroin addict and prostitute who bore ill will toward Taylor
for his continued protestations of innocence, which implicated her as
the person guilty of the crimes with which he was charged. She ack-
nowledged under oath having been promised leniency in exchange for
her testimony against Taylor and, in fact, had not been prosecuted for
several felonies to which she admitted, but had rather been allowed to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor-possessing narcotics paraphernalia-
and had been promised treatment for narcotics addiction at a state
rehabilitation center.30
The dissent in Taylor disagreed strongly with the majority's con-
clusions. In Justice Burke's view, the Harris Court would allow the
impeachment at issue in Taylor. The Harris decision authorized im-
peachment use of illegally obtained evidence in all but a very narrow,
and as yet undefined, area. The Court, in allowing impeachment by
prior inconsistent statements, relied on Walder and refused to attach
any significance to the fact that the physical evidence used to impeach
Harris related directly to the crime charged: "[w]e are not persuaded
that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different
from that reached by the Court in Walder."'3 2  The value of furnishing
27. 8 Cal. 3d at 185, 501 P.2d at 925, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
28. Id. at 185-86, 501 P.2d at 925-26, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58, citing Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
29. 8 Cal. 3d at 185, 501 P.2d at 925, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
30. Id. at 185-86, 501 P.2d at 926, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
31. The use of tainted physical evidence having nothing to do with the crime
charged or the circumstances surrounding the alleged event to impeach a defendant
may be rationalized by the ability of the jury to still adjudge the defendant innocent,
though feeling his credibility to be less than desirable. Where the trial testimony and
the illegally-obtained evidence both relate to the same transaction, as in Harris, judicial
abhorrence of letting the defendant get away with a seeming lie is also understandable.
But neither of these circumstances comports with the desirability of imposing sanctions
for obtaining evidence in contravention of the Bill of Rights. See Reconstitution,
supra note 4, at 211.
32. 401 U.S. at 225.
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tools for assessing a defendant's credibility was felt to outweigh any
benefit to be derived from a rule excluding evidence obtained by
illegal means. The fact that the Harris Court was willing to extend the
Walder rationale to support impeachment use of Harris' statements ob-
tained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, which itself provides for
exclusion, 33 indicates the Court did not intend that a mere judicially-
fashioned rule of exclusion, with its primary thrust toward deterrence
of illegal police conduct, should preclude impeachment.
The dissent in Taylor, however, would seemingly go well beyond
the limits of Harris. Justice Burke reasoned:
[A]s we have seen, the jury could well have found that the illegally
obtained evidence was inconsistent with an inference arising from
defendant's direct testimony. The shield provided by the exclusionary
rule should not be perverted into a license to commit perjury by way
of a defense or to give misleading testimony on direct examination
from which inferences of false matters could well be made by the
jury.
The fact that here the illegally obtained evidence circumstantially
rebutted an inference arising from defendant's direct testimony, whereas
in Harris the illegally obtained evidence directly rebutted specific false
statements on direct examination also does not serve to distinguish this
case from Harris, and the majority does not claim otherwise.8 4
Justice Burke argued that Taylor, in his direct testimony, had claimed
that he never possessed the purse with the heroin in it; that this consti-
tuted a general denial of the crime of possession of narcotics; that such
a denial is a denial of every fact essential to guilt; that one such fact is
knowledge of the narcotic character of the substance; and that the im-
peaching evidence was introduced to contradict this denial of knowledge
of narcotic character.35 Using such a tenuous line of reasoning, an
inference of false matters could be drawn from practically any denial by
a defendant. In fact, Justice Burke seems to suggest that an inference
arises whenever there is conflicting testimony, and that impeachment
by illegally obtained evidence should be allowed whenever such an
inference exists. Thus, it would appear that the dissenters in Taylor
would not only allow impeachment use of the tainted evidence in cases
such as Walder and Harris, but in virtually any case. 0 Fortunately,
33. See Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 200-01, 213.
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 189, 501 P.2d at 928, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 187, 501 P.2d at 926-27, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
36. Justice Burke did observe that "[t]his is not a case where an involuntary statement
was used for impeachment purposes, nor a case in which a prior conviction invalid
under Gideon v. Wainwright was used to blacken the defendant's character and thus
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none of the decisions to date have allowed such impeachment when a
defendant merely denies commission of the charged crime.
37
Additionally, the Taylor dissent, reading the testimony of Taylor's
companion more favorably to the prosecution, concluded any assumed
error was unprejudicial and harmless. Even discounting the companion's
testimony, Justice Buike contended, the evidence overwhelmingly es-
tablished that Taylor at least jointly possessed the discovered contraband
or was guilty as an aider and abettor. 38  The majority, correctly it seems,
refused to accept this contention since they recognized that the deeply
implicated companion's testimony was crucial to any theory of guilt.
When a criminal verdict depends so heavily upon the jury's judgment
of the credibility of conflicting witnesses, it is difficult to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that use of illegally obtained evidence to
impeach the defendant's testimony did not affect the verdict.39
The line of cases commencing with Agnello and terminating in
Taylor leaves the California criminal defendant in a quandary. Walder,
restricting Agnello to its particular facts, allowed impeachment use of
illegally obtained physical evidence not directly related to the charged
crime where the defendant took the witness stand and made "sweeping
claims" extending beyond a mere denial of the crime for which he was
on trial.40  The Harris Court allowed impeachment by tainted evidence
relating to the actual crimes charged where, though not phrased in
terms of "I didn't do it," Harris' testimony seemed little more than a
denial that he had committed the crime of selling narcotics. 41  Follow-
ing Harris, only a defendant with considerable temerity would have
taken the witness stand in his own defense if there were illegally obtained
evidence which he did not wish before the jury, whether that evidence
was physical evidence or incriminating prior statements. 42  That the
damage his general credibility." 8 Cal. 3d at 189-90 n.2, 501 P.2d at 928 n.2, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 360 n.2 (citations omitted). He also noted, but did not discuss, the fact
that a majority of the present United States Supreme Court had recently distinguished
Harris as a case in which "'the record of a prior conviction was used for the purpose
of directly rebutting a specific false statement made from the witness stand.'" Id.,
quoting Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.11 (1972).
37. The Harris decision, however, unlike Agnello and Walder, left unresolved the
point at which a testifying defendant becomes subject to impeachment by unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence. Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 216; see 8 Cal. 3d at
190 n.3, 501 P.2d at 928-29 n.3, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61 n.3.
38. 8 Cal. 3d at 190-91, 501 P.2d at 929-30, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
39. Id. at 186, 501 P.2d at 926, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
40. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
42. Although the defendant whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated
seemed to have no weapon to wield against impeachment use of tainted evidence, a
19733
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seemingly broad holding in Harris would be so easily distinguished and
Agnello again introduced on the scene seemed improbable, if not im-
possible. It seems likely that had Taylor been before the United States
Supreme Court the result would have been different.43  How long this
bright spot for the California defendant who is subjected to illegal police
conduct will remain is uncertain. Beyond a doubt, defendants, prose-
cutors and trial judges are facing a difficult task in reconciling the
various decisions and ascertaining when impeachment use of illegally ob-
tained evidence is or is not permissible.
Martha A. Roof
glimmer of hope was afforded the witness claiming Fifth Amendment protection by
the Harris Court's specification that the prior statements be "trustworthy." 401 U.S.
at 224. See Reconstitution, supra note 4, at 213-15.
43. But consider the language quoted from Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972),
in note 36 supra.
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